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 CLD-163       NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-4384 
___________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
DAVID ROBINSON, 
   Appellant 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Crim. No. 2-04-cr-00655-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable Berle M. Schiller 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action  Pursuant to  
Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 and for Possible Issuance  
of  a Certificate of Appealability Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)  
January 30, 2014 
Before:  FUENTES, JORDAN and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: February 4, 2014) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 David Robinson, proceeding pro se, appeals from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania’s order denying his motions requesting 
adjustment of his sentence and termination of a term of supervised release that has not yet 
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begun.  Because this appeal presents no substantial question, we will summarily affirm 
the District Court’s judgment.  See 3d Cir. LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6. 
I. 
 In 2004, Robinson pleaded guilty to three counts of bank robbery and one count of 
possession of heroin by a prisoner.  After we vacated Robinson’s original sentence so that 
the District Court could adequately address Robinson’s sentence challenges, see United 
States v. Robinson, 186 F. App’x 311 (3d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (nonprecedential 
opinion), he was ultimately sentenced to 151 months’ imprisonment, to be followed by 
five years of supervised release.  We affirmed the judgment and conviction.  See United 
States v. Robinson, 293 F. App’x 958 (3d Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (nonprecedential 
opinion).  In 2009, Robinson filed a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence 
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.  The District Court denied that motion; Robinson did not seek a 
certificate of appealability.  In 2010, Robinson filed another § 2255 motion that the 
District Court dismissed as an unauthorized second or successive motion.  After the 
District Court denied a motion for reconsideration, Robinson sought a certificate of 
appealability, which we denied.  See United States v. Robinson, 467 F. App’x 100 (3d 
Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (non precedential opinion). 
 Robinson recently filed two motions in the District Court, seeking to adjust his 
sentence and “terminate” his supervised release.  The District Court, adopting the 
reasoning of the Government’s opposition to Robinson’s motions, denied those motions.  
Robinson appeals. 
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II. 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We may summarily affirm if 
an appeal presents no substantial question.  LAR 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
III.  
 Robinson’s conviction became final when the period for petitioning for certiorari 
from the Supreme Court on direct appeal expired.  See Kapral v. United States, 166 F.3d 
565, 570-71 (3d Cir. 1999).  After his conviction becomes final, a federal prisoner 
generally may challenge the legality of his conviction or sentence only through a motion 
filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.  Okereke v. United States, 307 F.3d 117, 120 (3d Cir. 
2002).  However, if a § 2255 motion would be “inadequate or ineffective,” a petitioner 
may seek federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 via the “safety valve” clause of 
§ 2255(e).
 1
  Cradle v. United States ex rel. Miner, 290 F.3d 536, 538 (3d Cir. 2002) (per 
curiam).  The safety valve provided by § 2255(e) is a narrow one that applies only in rare 
situations, such as when a prisoner has had no prior opportunity to challenge his 
conviction for a crime later deemed to be noncriminal by an intervening change in the 
law.  See In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 Robinson argued in his motion to adjust his sentence that in light of the United 
States Supreme Court’s ruling in Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013), his 
Sentencing Guidelines range was incorrectly determined based on an uncharged offense.  
In his motion to terminate his term of supervised release, Robinson argued that it was 
                                              
1
 To the extent that Robinson is proceeding pursuant to § 2241, a certificate of 
appealability is not required.  See Burkey v. Marberry, 556 F.3d 142, 146 (3d Cir. 2009). 
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unlawful to sentence him to supervised release, and that only fines or imprisonment are 
recognized as lawful punishments in the appropriate charging statutes.  Neither of these 
arguments demonstrates a limitation in § 2255’s scope or procedure so as to allow 
application of the safety valve clause.  Specifically, Robinson’s argument that the District 
Court improperly relied upon an uncharged offense when determining his Sentencing 
Guideline range misconstrues the Supreme Court’s holding in Alleyne.  In Alleyne, the 
Supreme Court held that a fact that increases a mandatory minimum sentence must be 
submitted to the jury and be found beyond a reasonable doubt.  133 S. Ct. at 2162-63.  
That ruling “does not mean that any fact that influences judicial discretion must be found 
by a jury.”  Id. at 2163.  Thus, the District Court retained the ability to make factual 
findings necessary to calculate Robinson’s advisory Sentencing Guidelines range.  See 
United States v. Claybrooks, 729 F.3d 699, 708 (7th Cir. 2013).  Moreover, Robinson’s 
argument that supervised release is not a punishment contemplated in the charging 
statutes is meritless.
2
  See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(a) (“The court, in imposing a sentence to a 
term of imprisonment for a felony or misdemeanor, may include as a part of the sentence 
a requirement that the defendant be placed on a term of supervised release after 
imprisonment . . . .”).  Accordingly, the District Court properly denied Robinson’s 
motions attacking his sentence. 
IV. 
                                              
2
 Notably, Robinson’s motion challenging his term of supervised release was not in the 
nature of a motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1) seeking to terminate or modify a term of 
supervised release.  Rather, Robinson asserted a § 2255-style claim that the District Court 
lacked authority under the circumstances to actually impose a term of supervised release. 
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 For the foregoing reasons, and because this appeal does not present a substantial 
question, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
3
  See LAR 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
 
                                              
3
 To the extent, if any, that Robinson requires a certificate of appealability, we decline to 
issue one.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). 
